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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
_ DECEIVED
^AW LIBRARY

WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA
A. BUTKOVICH, husband and wife;
G. W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D.
BANKS, and all unknown oersons
who claim any interest in the
subject matter of this action,
Defendants.
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA.
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife, Third Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a cor
poration; and SECURITY
TITLE COMPANY, a corpor
ation,
Third Party
Defendants.
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A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife, Third Party
PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY and PARK CITY,
a municipal Corporation, Third Party
Defendant Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Summit County, Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge
Robert W. Adkins
Summit County Attorney,
Summit County Courthouse
Coalville, Utah 84017
Attorney for Appellant

Ralph J. Marsh
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A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife, Third Party
PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY and PARK CITY,
a municipal Corporation, Third Party
Defendant Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appellant reaffirms its statement of facts in its initial brief and makes the following
statements regarding respondents' statement of facts. The respondents assert that "the
references on Page 2 [of appellant's brief] to the deeds to and from Security Title Company
are irrelevant and do not accurately state where the description in those deeds came from."
(Respondents' Brief, P. 4.) The attorney for the respondent apparently did not believe those
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.
Heeds to be irrelevant when
he offered
Exhibit
11B, which contained those deeds to and

from Security Title Company, at the trial. The deeds to and from Security Title Company
are relevant because they contain a substantially different description than is contained in
either the Butkovichs' answer, counterclaim, third party complaint, or decree quieting title.
The differences between the deeds to and from Security Title and the different description
contained in all of the Butkovich pleadings, was never explained either to the lower court or
in the respondents' brief. The respondents allege that the appellant did not ''accurately state
where the description on" the deeds to and from Security Title came from. That inaccuracy
was caused by Mr. Butkovich, because he testified that the description was prepared by Mr.
Raymond L. Griffith (Tr. 68), but Mr. Griffith denied that he had prepared or given it to
Mr. butkovich (Tr. 109). The inaccuracy created by Mr. Butkovich was glossed over, but
never clarified nor explained, in the respondents' brief.

ARGUMENT
The Butkovichs argue in their brief that Summit County has no right to challenge their
title. In reply to those issues Summit County will respond to those points.

POINT I
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS
OWN DEED AND DENYING THE TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHS.
In support of its argument that the County is estopped from challenging its deed, the
Butkovichs cite the case of Daniell vs. Sherril, 48 So. 2d 736, 23 ALR 2d 1410 (1950), a
decision from the State of Florida. It is interesting to note that the Butkovichs did not cite
any Utah authority on this point, apparently because there is none that supports their
position. In fact, the Utah law in this regard is clearly contrary to the position taken by the
Butkovichs. The Court in Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P2d 965, 968
(1947), clearly established that a county is not estopped from challenging the validity of its
own tax deed simply because the county was the grantor. The Court said:
Plaintiff also contends in support of his demurrer, that the defendants'
answer alleges facts which estop Carbon County from denying the validity of
plaintiff's Digitized
tax deed,
and that defendants stand in no better position than
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Carbon County, their grantor. Assumming for the purpose of this argument
only, that the county could be estopped in a case like this, we find nothing
in the answer from which it could be inferred that the county made any representations whatsoever, or that plaintiff relied upon any representations of the
county in purchasing the tax deed. On the contrary, it is a well recognized
principle that counties do not warrant tax titles. Purchasers of tax titles, take
subject to the previous owner's right of redemption and to any defects or infirmities in the procedure through which the county acquired its interest. There is
nothing in defendants' answer from which an estoppel against the county, or its
successors in interest can be inferred.
Daniell vs. Sherill, supra, while it may be applicable in Florida, is clearly not good law
in Utah. This matter is controlled by this Court's decision in Duncan vs. Hemmelwright,
supra, and Summit County is not estopped from challenging the deeds to the Butkovichs.
There is nothing in the record indicating that Summit County made any representations
whatsoever to the Butkovichs regarding the property. It should be remembered that Mr.
Butkovich researched the tax records prior to making the offer to Summit County for the
tax deeds, and it was Mr. Butkovich who came up with the description contained in the tax
deeds (Tr. 67). Summit County made no representations to Mr. Butkovich when he
purchased the tax deeds at the private sale, and, therefore, Summit County is not estopped
from challenging the deeds issued to the Butkovichs.
POINT II
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT BARRED BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
FROM CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHS.
The Butkovichs argue that the County is equitably estopped from challenging the title
of the Butkovichs because of its levy, assessment, and collection of taxes for previous years
and because of Summit County's failure to refund or offer to refund the taxes collected on
the property. In support of its argument, the Butkovichs cite only the decision in Daniell vs.
Sheril, supra, which, as previously pointed out, is not good law in Utah. Certainly the
assessment and collection of taxes does not bar the County (or any other claimant) from
claiming title to the property. The Butkovichs in their argument have ignored the applicable
Utah statutes regarding the repayment of the purchase price of an invalid tax title and the
taxes paid by the purchaser for subsequent years. Section 59-10-65, U.C.A., provides:
Every person who has purchased or shall hereafter purchase any invalid
the Howard
W. Hunterin
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Law School,
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act have a lein against such property for the recovery of the amount of the
purchase price paid to the county therefor to the extent that the county would
have a lien prior to the sale by the county, but in no event shall the lien be
greater than the amount of taxes, interest, and penalties, or the amount
actually paid whichever is smaller; provided however, taxes paid by the
purchaser for subsequent years after the purchase from the county shall be
included in the amount secured by said lien, which has not already been recovered. Such lien shall have the same priority against such property as the
lien for the delinquent taxes which were liquidated by such purchase except
that it shall not have preference over any right, title or interest in or lien
against such property acquired since the purchase of such tax title and prior
to the effective date of this section for value and without notice and such lien
shall bear interest at the legal rate for a period of not to exceed four years.
Such lien shall be foreclosed in any action wherein the invalidity of such tax
title is determined. If such lien is not foreclosed at the time of the determination of the invalidity of such tax title, any later action to foreclose such lien
shall be forever barred, provided that where such determination was made
prior to the effective date of this section such action may be commenced at
any time within one year after such effective date.
This Court in Farrer vs. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954), interpreted
Section 59-10-65. In that case, this Court held that the plaintiffs, the losing parties, were
entitled to a tax lien pursuant to Section 59-10-65, U.C.A., and for closure thereof for the
- amount actually paid for the tax deeds, plus subsequent general taxes paid and interest at
the legal rate for the statutory period. In the present case, the Butkovichs would be entitled
to a refund and forclosure of the taxes paid, if the decision of the lower court is reversed.
Under Utah law, Summit County does not have to refund or offer to refund the taxes
collected. Summit County will do equity in this cae, i.e. refund the taxes, if the decision is
reversed. This is the procedure clearly established by Section 59-10-65, U.C.A.
This Court many years ago determined that in a suit to quiet title that a plaintiff need
not offer in the complaint to repay the taxes or other advances made by the defendants.
Burton vs. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P.2d 652 (1937).

POINT III
THE INTEREST OF SUMMIT COUNTY WAS NEVER CONVEYED
TO THE BUTKOVICHS.
The Butkovichs inaccurately assert that the only reference to Summit County being the
owner of the property
in this
decsion
in Colman
vs. Butkovich,
Digitized
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Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU. 538 P.2d 188 (1975)
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was ''after the tax deeds to the County * * * and prior to the conveyance of the title by the
County to the Butkovichs in 1964. * * * There is no holding anywhere in that opinion that
Summit County now holds title." That assertion by the Butkovichs is totally inaccurate.
This Court at 538 P.2d 189 held: "The litigation here, under such circumstances, hardly
could prevail where Summit County, the owner, was not named a party here." The
litigation was initiated by Colman against Banks approximately seven yers after the tax
deeds from Summit County. If Summit County's interest in the property had been
extinguished by the tax deeds to the Butkovichs, as alleged by the Butkovichs, this Court
surely would have not used the quoted language. The only interpretation that can
reasonably be drawn from the quoted language is that the quiet title action between Colman
and the Butkovichs could not result in a decree quieting title for either party, because the
owner, Summit County, was not a party to the litigation. That interpretation is completely
consistent with what this Court did in its direction to the trial court simply to dismiss the
complaint, and it did not order any affirmative relief for the Butkovichs.
The doctrine of after acquired title, as asserted by the Butkovichs, is not applicable in
this instance. Rather than being a situation of after acquired title, the facts of the case
clearly indicate that the deed of Summit County to "all land west of this block" conveyed
nothing to the defendant. It is not a case of the County conveying title to the property it did
not have, and then subsequently acquiring title to it. In this sitution the County obtained
title at the original tax sale to Summit County, and never transferred title to the Butkovichs.
The title to the property involved has been in the County for forty years.
Even assuming that this were a situation of after acquired title, that doctrine does not
apply to tax deeds from the County. The Butkovichs again rely on Daniell vs. Sherril,
supra, which while it may be good law in Florida, is clearly contrary to the law of Utah. In
Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, supra, this Court clearly held that the doctrine of after acquired
title does not apply to tax deeds from the County. This Court at 186 P.2d 968 held:
Plaintiff next contends that the answer shows title to the land in plaintiff
by operation of the doctrine of after acquired title. It is plaintiffs contention
that if the county acquired any interest in the land in question under the
bankruptcy proceedings, such after-acquired title passed immediately to the
plaintiff. The contention also is without merit. The deed from the county to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff, was a quitclaim deed. A quitclaim deed does not convey and afteracquired title. 7 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Ed., Sees. 3845,
3846, pp. 310-312; 4 Tiffany Real Property, 3d Ed., Sec. 1231, p. 642.
The title to the property has been, and remains in Summit County. The Butkovichs
acquired nothing by the tax deed from Summit County, and the doctrine of after acquired
title is inapplicable.
POINT IV
THE FACT THAT THE AUDITOR'S AFFIDAVITS WERE NOT
ATTACHED TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL WAS ARGUED BEFORE
THE LOWER COURT.
The respondents allege that the County did not raise in the lower court the fact that the
auditor's affidavits were not attached to the assessment roll with respect to the property
here involved. The respondents allege that "this is the first time in this case that this
assertion has been made. It was not brought to the attention of the lower court. It appeared
nowhere in the record of this case." This was presented to the lower court. However, it does
not appear in the record, because the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was not
reported. The County attempted to order a transcript of the hearing but could not do so
because the hearing and the arguments of counsel were not recorded.
The responsibility for the failure of this to appear of record is solely that of the counsel
for the County. Having only been involved in this case for a few weeks prior to the hearing,
counsel mistakenly believed that Exhibit 11 A, the Abstract of Title prepared by Western
States Title Insurance Company for the Butkovichs was the same Abstract of Title which
counsel for the plaintiff Colman has given to the County, and which had been prepared by
Security Title Company. The Abstract of Title prepared by the Security Title Company on
the property involved included the lack of the required auditor's affidavits on file, while the
abstract prepared for the Butkovichs did not. Counsel for the County did not discover this
error until he was preparing his brief on appeal. The lack of the auditor's affidavit was
argued by counsel before the lower court, and is not raised for the first time on appeal, as
alleged by the Butkovichs. Since this issue was presented and argued before the lower court,
Digitized
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POINT V
SUMMIT COUNTY IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FROM MAINTAINING THIS ACTION TO RECOVER THE PROPERTY.
The respondents allege that Summit County is barred by the Statute of Limitations in
Section 78-12-5.1 and 5.2, U.C.A. The respondents maintain that these sections bar any
action or defense against the holder of a tax title unless the party bringing the action or
asserting the defense has had possession of the property within four years of such action.
The various statutes dealing with limitations of actions and with adverse possession
have been subject to a number of legislative enactments and to a considerable number of
decisions by the Court in recent years. These amendments, together with the other pertinent
sections of the Code, are now numbered as Sections 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 9, 12, and
12.1 of Chapter 12, Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Under those statutes the holder of a tax title cannot claim absolute ownership to the
real property based solely upon holding the tax title for four years after purchase from the
County. The sections above referred to must be read together, and they specify the elements
of adverse possession and that the holding of a tax title for four years after purchase from
the County is only one of those elements.
The Butkovichs have not fenced, cultivated, or occupied the land (a hillside in the Park
City area) (Tr. 115).
This Courin in Lyman vs. National Mortgage Bond Corporation, 320 P.2d 322, 7 Utah
2d 123 (1958), thoroughly interpreted Section 78-12-5.1 and 5.2, U.C.A. 1953. In that case
the plaintiffs had secured a tax deed from the county in 1941 and had since been in actual
possession, had cultivated the property and improved and fenced it. However, they failed to
show payment of taxes for four consecutive years even though the evidence was clear that
those taxes not paid were subsequently redeemed. However, the Court held that the
plaintiffs did not bring themselves within the statute, and the holding of that case is
controlling in the case at bar:
"In Bowen v Olson, decided in 1953 under Section 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953,
prior to the 1951 amendment, we held that a redemption from a delinquent
tax assessed
against this property claimed by adverse possesion under a tax
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sale did not constitute a payment of taxes levied and assessed upon such
property within the meaning of that statute. After a careful consideration we
adopted the majority rule on that question and we are not now inclined to
overrule that decision but adhere thereto. The facts in that case are not distinguishable from the facts in this case.
"Plaintiffs contend that a different result is rquired by the 1951 amendments to Section 104-2-5, U.C.A. 1943, which is the same as 78-12-5.1, Pocket.
Supplement to Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953, and Section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah
for 1951, which is the same as Section 78-12-5.2, Pocket Supplement to
Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. In plaintiffs brief these sections are referred to as
statutes of limitation as distinguished from the other sections previously
cited above, which are referred to as adverse possession statutes. Hereinafter,
these designations will be used to distinguish the two sets of statutes.
'These sections forbid the commencement or maintenance of an action
or defense claiming ownership or right of possession to real property, unless
the claimant was seized, possessed or occupied such property within seven
years prior to the commencement of such action. Where the adverse party,
in such action, claims under a tax title the limitations period is shortened to
require seizure, possession or occupation within four years after the creation
of the tax title claim. These statutes are different from the adverse possession
statutes considered above in that they contain no requirement that the adverse
party to the claimant in such action must have had adverse possession and paid
all taxes assessed against such property during the limitations period. In fact,
the limitation statutes make no mention of any rights which the adverse party
must have in order to invoke the provisions of these limitation statutes,,
"A very strict construction of these statutes might require a holding in
plaintiff's favor even though they have failed to show payment of the taxes for
the period required by the adverse possession statutes, for it is clear that none
of the defendants have actually occupied or been in possession of the property
within the prescribed limitations period. However, plaintiff's can prevail only
if we hold that defendants' claims are barred under these limitations statues
by their failure to occupy or be in possession of the property within the
prescribed period, regardless of whether plaintiffs have proved a valid claim
to this property. Such a holding would leave the plaintiffs in possession although
they have failed to establish any valid claim to such property under the adverse
possession statutes previously discussed on which their claims are based or by any
other means.
4

'We do not think that such construction of these statues was intended.
Plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own claim and not alone on the
weakness of the defendants' claims in order to succeed. The mere failure of the
defendants to show that they have actually occupied or been in possession
of this property is not sufficient to bar their rights to recover the property
where, as here, plaintiffs have failed to establish any valid claim or right to the
property in themselves. These limitation statutes, although they do not
expressly so provide, only bar the right of a party to maintain an action to
recover real property where the opposing party established a right of possession
or ownership in the property. This plaintiffs have failed to do, so the
decision must be reversed."
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CONCLUSION

The Butkovichs do not have and have not proven any title to the real property here
involved. The tax deeds were fatally defective as to this property, and no portion of this
property was conveyed to the respondents. The Butkovichs have made a brazen attempt to
acquire ground to which they have no title, and is in fact owned and occupied by other
persons not joined in this action and who reside on the property. This Court has already
determined in the earlier proceedings that Summit County was the real owner of the
property. Unless the principals of res judicata and stare decises are dead, the decree quieting
title in the Butkovichs should be reversed and title to the property should be quieted in
Summit County.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert W. Adkins
Summit County Attorney
Attorney for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

